Judging Judicial Perks

The San Francisco Daily Journal, a legal newspaper, published an article on April 8, 2009 that caught my eye. It's titled, "San Bernardino Supervisors Decide Not to Ax Judges' Perks." The article discusses politicians debating whether the county should eliminate judicial perks in this time of severe budgetary constraints.

Background: Superior court judges in California are paid by the state. They make $179,000 per year plus they get a good health plan and fantastic retirement benefits. If you are lucky enough to be a judge in one of 31 counties (of the 58 counties in California), the county bestows perks on top of state salaries and benefits. For example, in Los Angeles County, judges receive an additional $46,000 per annum. And judges in Tulare County get free gym memberships paid for by taxpayers. I'm in favor of judges staying healthy, but is this really necessary and is it good public policy?

Last October, an appellate court ruled that these county supplements to judicial salaries are unconstitutional because the state legislature hadn't approved them. In response, the legistature quickly ratified them and declared that counties could stop them whenever they want.

Those who defend the practice say county perks are necessary to attract competent candidates for judgeships who otherwise would stay in private practice to make even more money. I say let them stay where they are. Who are these people that we need so much, and whose competence is so great, that we should worry that they will refuse the job because they just can't make it on $179,000 a year? I prefer my judges to be people who can relate to ordinary folks who make it on far less.

Detractors, according to the article, say that judges who take county money are "double-dipping." But that accusation is both unfair and misses the mark. Judges are not fudging numbers to get more than they deserve. There's no accounting fraud going on here.

What the article misses is the more interesting question whether these judges have a conflict of interest in every case they hear in which the county is a party. If I were a litigant before a judge who accepts a $46,000 annual gratuity from my opponent, I would worry about how fair that judge could be. A judge who accepts money from a party normally recuses himself under settled standards of judicial ethics. Why is it any different if that party is the county?

One way out of this is for the judges to refuse these county perks just like they should refuse an ordinary bribe. Any judges out there willing to do this?